The image of the Philippines announced revealing the military fleet to anchor at the first three-year beach, simultaneously showing Chinese attempts to the East Sea.

The Philippines Coastal Police on April 15 announced the image of Chinese iron shell vessels anchoring at the first three-year beach in the ware of existent islands, belonging to the Spratly Islands of Vietnam, where the Philippines also claimed sovereignty

Foreign Policy's commentator Ryan Martinson and Andrew Erickson indicates that the Philippines also posted another video, showing that the Chinese ships are 6 pieces that the sailor on BRP Cabra has seen during the patrolier over two

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"Fishing ships really can't anchor a place for many weeks so many weeks, especially when the weather is extremely convenient to catch. The captain of this ship's group is clearly not interested in economic losses due to not hitting

China is said to be funding for fishermen to perform similar operations.

Foreign Policy commentators have discovered many details related to the group of anchored ships at the Beachfront Beach can reveal China's trueness.

6 ships were suspected of Chinese militia, including Yuexinhuiyu 60138 and 60139, anchored at the Beach of the Spratly of Vietnam on March 27.

"This is a remarkable point, because the Military Forces of Guangdong Province are often thought to not have many roles in the South China Sea, different from the forces from Hainan or Guangxi. This concept needs to change",

In November 2013, Major General Gai Longyun, Commanders of Guangdong Zone Zone, visited Taichan city of this province to convey new centralities from the central government.

Within a few months, Guangdong Zone started to use "afored forces", including militia, participating in the "struggle" on the sea.

Behind them, at the Hai and Third Line and Line, the Chinese Scrab and Navy forces.

In the group of 6 Chinese vessels anchoring at the first three yards, two cars have the number of Yuexinhuiyu 60138 and Yuexinhuiyu 60139, meaning they are registered in Tan Hoi district, Jiangmen city, Guangdong.

These two vessels are equipped with automatic identification system transceivers, meaning their movement can be monitored, at least at some time.

This location is located on the chewing channel, just below the Macao coast.

China's profile confirms YueXinhuiyu 60138 and 60139 are fishing vessels.

In 2019, 6 units in this fleet were said to work in the Spratly Islands of Vietnam.

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Three weeks present of more than 200 Chinese fishing vessels on the South China Sea.

Commenters Martinson and Erickson predicted that this year's activities are similar to 2019, Yuexinhuiyu 60138 and 60139 will perform 3 or 4 trips to Truong Sa.

According to the commentators, the Tan Hoi district has supported PAFMM forces in at least two decades.

This militaries attracted the attention in China in December 2014, when the PLA Daily posted the images of PAFMM Tan Hoi force was "tactical training", which means with weapons, while on the above

By 2016, Tan Hoi established a "sea far away" militia, the term used to refer to the area around the Spratly Islands.

Thus, only two ships, observers have gained a lot of new information about PAFMM's activities in the South China Sea, such as the frequency and period of operation, the support of the Central Government

"4 The remaining Guangdong vessels at the Beach will also have a biography, help provide more information about PAFMM organizations and activities. In fact, all information about Fisheries, militants or force Other China in Trường Sa helps reveal Beijing's strategy in the South China Sea. Thanks to the images of the Philippines Coast Guard, we can start to grasp the story, "the commentators of Foreign Policy evaluate.

They also concluded that only with open sources of information, China's argument on the presence of the ship's ship at the Beachfront was obtained.

"The Philippines has a clear policy change when sharing many unprecedented information about China's activities in the South China Sea. Even without the engine of Manila, this new transparency is opening the opportunity to find